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Introduction
Knowledge is a rather new member of the "commons family". For quite a while, it has played 
a minor role in the research on commons and governance systems. However, since last decade, both 
its relevance and attention gained have tremendously increased. Open Access (OA) to (scientific) 
knowledge will play an increasingly important role in (the study of) the digital age. This paper focuses 
on the problems of collective action in the creation of an OA repository as a knowledge commons and 
thus contributes to this development.
The case of open access to scholarly knowledge is relevant not only because of its recent nature; 
it also shows the story of a good whose use has severely suffered from the impact of privatization. While 
academic journals have been the traditional forum for making scientific information and innovation 
known to peers and other audiences, this format has gone through two big institutional changes during 
the last 30 years. Firstly, the publishing rights and habits changed in a way that the ownership of more 
and more journals ended up in the hands of a few very big and influential publishing companies (e.g. 
Oxford University Press, Routledge). Secondly, the upcoming of the Internet made it much easier and 
less costly to disseminate publications (Suber 2007; Hess and Ostrom 2007). The combination of these 
two processes produced a system of enclosure and rising prices: between 1986 and 2000 the average 
price for journal subscriptions has tripled (Hess 2005).1
Open Access in the form of online repositories is an attempt to counter this enclosure and turn 
scientific knowledge from a club back to a public good (Kranich 2007; cp. Table 1). The governance of 
OA repositories is comparable to that of all other commons. In a way it depends on the organization 
of collective action. It is prone to social dilemmas as well. For knowledge commons, this dilemma 
does not so much come in the form of the famous "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968), where the 
rationally induced overuse by individuals unavoidably leads to the destruction of a resource. Rather, OA 
repositories are likely to suffer from a social dilemma which the commons theorist Peter Suber labeled 
the "tragic stalemate" (2007:183). The tragic stalemate points to a situation of collective paralysis in 
which all potential users of a good would profit from its provision, but none of them wants to take the 
first step to provide it.
For the case studied in this paper, this stalemate means that it is problematic to attract scholars 
who submit their work to an OA repository and thereby contribute to the creation of the knowledge 
commons which would result from participation. Evidence shows, however, that this stalemate cannot 
be overarching or unavoidable, since the number and sizes of repositories rise steadily (Suber 2007). 
The question therefore is: if there is a tragic stalemate and individual scholars hesitate to make their 
work OA, why are some repositories still successful in attracting scholars to submit their work, while 
others are not?
Following the work by Elinor Ostrom, the answer to this question is assumed to lie in the 
repositories' institutional designs. It is assumed that the inclusion of community elements and the 
provision of explicit rules will help counter the tragic stalemate and thus pose a positive effect on the 
repositories'performance in attracting participation and contributions.
This paper is structured as follows: in order to test the effect of these two factors (community 
and rules), the institutional design of six OA repositories is analyzed in a comparative case study. Before
1 This development in skyrocketing prices for journal articles and subscriptions is also known as the "serial 
crisis"in academic publishing. For more information on this topic, see Hess 2005, Suber 2007.
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the analysis, I give an introduction to the field of common goods in general, and knowledge commons 
in particular. I explain what OA is and how repositories function. This rather technical part is followed 
up by theoretical considerations on the collective action problem involved in the governance of OA 
repositories, and the possibility of institutional design as a way out.
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1. The Influence of Institutional Design on the Perform ance of Open Access Repositories
This section shall give an introduction to and overview of the context of commons and 
commons research. Central concepts in this area shall be defined in order to locate their place and role 
in the theoretical considerations that follows.
1.1 The Governance of Open Access Repositories as a Collective Action Problem
Commons
Commons are a specific class of goods, and are referred to as common goods as well. Goods can 
be categorized by two dimensions: exclusivity and rivalry (Ostrom and Ostrom 1977). Exclusivity refers 
to the extent to which anyone can be hindered from consuming a good. In some cases it is almost 
impossible to exclude someone entirely, for example from breathing the air; in other cases it is simply 
too costly, for example to fence an entire forest. For all commons or common goods, it is difficult to 
exclude users.This makes them different from toll and private goods (see Table 1).
Rivalry
Low High
r - 'u
:-y ^
□
Public goods
Useful knowledge 
Air
Common-pool resources (CPR)
Libraries
Forests
E ft
m
Toll or club goods
Journal subscriptions 
Day-care centers
Private goods
Personal computers 
Doughnuts
Table 1 Types of goods (Source: adapted from Hess and Ostrom 2007:8); commons are highlighted.
The distinction within the class of common goods is made by the second dimension: rivalry. 
Rivalry emerges when the actions of one consumer reduce the units of consumption for all other users. 
For example, when one farmer retrieves water from an irrigation system, then no other farmer can use 
the same unit of water to irrigate his or her fields. Elinor Ostrom famously labeled goods with these 
characteristics"common-pool resources" (CPR). In contrast, public goods are non-rivalrous in nature.
All commons are owned by a group of people (in many cases by everyone) rather than single 
individuals. This ownership arrangement makes commons vulnerable to social dilemmas. Thought, 
only CPR suffer from the direct threat of depletion - meaning that they can be destroyed by overused
- public goods as well are prone to conflicts concerning the organization of their use. A special case of 
social dilemma is what Garrett Hardin (1968) named the tragedy of the commons. This special situation 
will be discussed at a later point of this paper.
Knowledge Commons
While many "traditional" commons are natural, knowledge commons - also referred to as 
intellectual, information or science commons - are human-made (Hess and Ostrom 2007:4). The prime 
example for a knowledge commons is the library.
Knowledge has traditionally been a public good, being non-exclusive and non-rivalrous
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in nature. However, with the introduction and spread of copy-right on intellectual property and 
the commercialization of its dissemination, it has become more and more of a club or even private 
good. Making knowledge a commons again is a countermeasure to this increased enclosure and its 
accompanying commercialization (Kranich 2007). Knowledge is -  like other goods - not naturally a 
commons. Whether or not it can be categorized as such depends heavily on how it is produced and 
managed.
Open Access and Open Access Repositories
Open Access to scientific literature is one such way of a commons-based production of 
knowledge that counters its privatization. The OA Movement, as it refers to itself, started already in the 
1990s, and has gathered real momentum during the last decade (Hess 2005). It is led by a group of 
people labeled informationists by information scientist Rick Luce (2008). This group includes librarians, 
information experts, scientists as well as faculty staff and people with a general interest in the topic. 
Together, they paved the way to a barrier-free access to scientific knowledge online, and thereby 
allowed a "shift from product focus to process focus" in knowledge management (Luce 2009; cp. Suber 
2007).
Open Access to scientific knowledge can be provided in two ways: 1) academic articles are 
directly published in special OA journals, or 2) articles published elsewhere are submitted to online 
repositories where they are freely accessible to all users with an Internet connection (Swan 2006). The 
first option is often referred to as gold OA (Poltermann 2009). It includes independent, or as Suber 
(2007) puts it, local peer-review. On the other hand, online repositories - often referred to as green OA
- do not include peer-reviewing processes, but rather provide a platform to present and share material 
that is peer-reviewed elsewhere. Repositories usually accept preprints (working papers or other forms 
of not-yet published work) as well as postprints (articles already published in a journal). It is therefore 
rather a form of "self-archiving" than a form of publishing in the traditional sense. This paper will focus 
on green OA only.
Green OA usually comes either in the form of a thematic repository or an institutional repository 
(Ostrom and Hess 2007). The repository is started by either individuals or institutions asking for the 
submission of pre- or postprints by colleagues in order to liberate access and ease dissemination. 
While contribution to most thematic repositories is voluntary, many institutional repositories work 
with mandates (Knezo 2005; AERA 2010). This means that scholars of a certain institution - universities, 
departments or scholarly societies - are obliged to self-archive all (new) work in the repositories.
For the question of why some repositories are more successful in attracting contributions, these 
mandated repositories are not of interest, or rather would spoil the outcomes of the analysis. Therefore, 
this paper focuses on thematic OA repositories only.
1.2 Theoretical Considerations
As already indicated in the previous chapter, commons are goods without clear ownership. This 
can lead to conflicting situations in their provision and management. In other words, they create a need 
for collective action (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990a). Knowledge commons in general and OA repositories 
in particular are no exceptions. In the following part, some theoretical considerations on the emergence 
of and solutions to collective action problems in the context of commons-based production will be 
presented. These theoretical considerations form the basis for the case studies in Chapter 3.
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Collective Action and the "Tragic Stalemate"
OA in contrast to market-regulated forms of disseminating scientific knowledge (e.g. via journal 
subscriptions) is a form of commons-based production (Hess and Ostrom 2007:5). Its provision is 
therefore achieved through cooperation and social mechanisms, rather than price signals or external 
regulation (cp. Benkler 2006). Furthermore, even if repositories are set up by librarians or individual 
scientists, they cannot fulfill their function properly or even survive if other scholars do not contribute 
to the commons by making their work OA and submitting it to the repository. In this line, Charlotte 
Hess, the founder of th e Digital Library of the Commons, an OA repository for research on commons, and 
one of the main theorists in the field of knowledge commons admits: the single biggest obstacle to OA 
is author inertia or omission (Hess 2005 based on Suber 2004). Thus, without the participation of the 
community as a whole, the commons cannot be provided. Thus, collective action is what is needed.2
However, as theory and practice have repeatedly proven, initiating collective action often 
turns out to be problematic (e.g. Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). A traditional danger with 
collective action is that only a few individuals share the burden of taking action, while many others 
free-ride on their accomplishments. The rational behaviour of individuals appears as an obstacle to 
reaching a collective goal. As such, Hardin's tragedy of the commons has taught us that even though 
collective action would benefit all consumers, no rationally-acting individual would commit him or 
herself to it. The reason for this is that the beneficial effect of sharing a good emerges only in the long­
term, while the short-term benefits of shirking and acting individually are considerably higher. Because 
this individual behaviour in the short-term is based on rational reasoning and thus unavoidable, the 
resulting depletion of a good or resource is inevitable as well.
However, this is mainly the case for common pool resources (CPR), which are rivalrous and thus 
depletable. Knowledge commons are public goods, and thus non-rivalrous in their use.Therefore, there 
is no danger of Hardin's tragedy of the commons here. Rather, OA repositories are likely to suffer from a 
social dilemma, which commons theorist Peter Suber called the"tragic stalemate"(2007:183).
The tragic stalemate refers to a situation, in which all participants (in this case the group 
which Luce labeled informationists) would benefit from the creation of a commons (free access to and 
dissemination of scientific literature in OA repositories), but none wants to take the first step to provide 
it. This individual hesitation leads to a collective paralysis ending in the non-provision of the desired 
good.
This is the key obstacle in the provision of knowledge commons and the problem central to 
this paper: if there is a tragic stalemate and individual scholars hesitate to make their workOA, why are 
some repositories still successful in attracting scholars to submit their work, while others are not?
Building on the work on managing CPR by Elinor Ostrom and her late colleagues (e.g. Ostrom 
1990; Ostrom et al. 1999), the answer to this question is assumed to lie in the repositories' institutional 
design.
The Role of Institutional Design
Ostrom has proved that, with an appropriate management system, CPRs do not necessarily 
have to suffer from the tragedy of the commons. There are robust ways of governing the commons as 
she showed in many cases of field research (Ostrom 1990c). These cases showed a considerable degree 
of self-governance by the communities sharing the commons in question.
2 Collective action is when "two or more individuals (are) needed to work together in order to accomplish an 
outcome" (Hess and Ostrom 2007:5).
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While Hardin saw the only way out of the tragedy of the commons in either external monitoring 
or privatization (cf. Hardin 1968), Ostrom countered that neither of them was necessary -  or even 
desirable -  for the sustainable management of CPR. Contrary to the assumption of many earlier rational 
choice theorists, first of all Mancur Olson, Ostrom did not reject that rational individuals could take 
long-term results into consideration, rather than only caring about short-term costs and benefits (cf. 
Ostrom 1990b). Thus, rationality could also mean thinking about the future and acting upon it in the 
presence.
Furthermore, Ostrom argued that the (rational) decision of any individual to join the creation 
and management of a commons depends heavily on how the management system is designed. 
Although she advices against a pre-defined set of institutions as being the panacea for all CPR problems, 
her analysis brought up eight design principles (see Box 1), which were present in all of the most robust 
cases she studied and absent in those that failed (Ostrom 1990c).
1. Clearly defined boundaries should be in place.
2. Rules in use that are well matched to local needs and conditions.
3. Individuals affected by these rules can usually participate in modifying the rules.
4. The right o f community members to devise their own rules is respected by external 
authorities.
5. A system for self-monitoring members’ behavior has been established.
6. A  graduated system of sanctions is available.
7. Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
Box 1 Design principle for robust, long-enduring CPR institutions as defined by Elinor Ostrom (Source: adapted from Hess and 
Ostrom 2007:7; cf. Ostrom 1990b).
In their seminal work Understanding Knowledge as a Commons, Hess and Ostrom (2007) did 
not automatically assume that these design principles will hold for the management of knowledge 
commons as well. However, neither do they reject it and ask for further research instead. What can be 
learned from Ostrom's work in general is that there is a positive relationship between the institutional 
design of a system created to manage the commons and its performance.
Institutional Design in the Case of OA Repositories
Due to their implicit focus on the governance of natural commons, it can be assumed that not 
all of the eight design principles can be relevant in the analysis of knowledge commons in general 
and OA repositories in particular. For this paper, the design principles shall, therefore, be summarized 
and translated into two single variables. These variables will be tested in a comparative case study in 
Chapter 4. The variables summarizing the two factors central to all of Ostrom's design principles will be 
called 1) community and 2) rules.
1) The factor of community in this case circumscribes the importance of involvement of 
individual consumers or users of a good in its management. This roughly combines Ostrom's second 
and third design principles, but goes beyond them. A strong sense of community gives credit to the 
act of self-governance and commons-based production (cp. Ostrom 1990b; Hess and Ostrom 2007). 
In the context of knowledge commons it is Nancy Kranich, who is pointing to the importance of peer 
production in their management: the "process by which many individuals, whose actions are neither 
coordinated by managers nor by price signals in the market, contribute to a joint effect that effectively 
produces a unit of informational or culture"(Kranich 2007: 93; for the concept and its original application 
see Benkler 2006).
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Furthermore, the aspect of being part of a process of self-governance or peer production when 
contributing to an OA repository is accompanied by the dynamics of community communication. 
Peter Suber (2007) names this as one of the most important tools in promoting OA and thus making 
scholars willing to contribute to the creation of the commons. Community in this sense emerges from 
the possibility to exchange experiences and information amongst its members.
Based on these considerations it can be expected that a high degree of community has a 
positive effect on the repositories' performance in attracting scholars to submit their work and thus 
contribute to the creation of the commons.
2) CPR research has taught that rules are essential for the management of all commons (Ostrom 
1990). Indeed, seven of Ostrom's eight design principles implicitly or explicitly concern the setting up 
and application of rules. Rules are in place in order to regulate the relations amongst the resource- 
sharing group members and to protect the commons from being destroyed or depleted. However, 
since knowledge commons are public goods rather than CPR, they are not directly threatened by 
depletion. Free-riding for example, as outlined above, is not possible in the case of OA repositories, 
since the commons created is meant to be used by anyone, whether the person has contributed to the 
production or not, as Hess (2005) puts it:"the more quality information, the greater the public good".
Therefore, rules for OA repositories have a different function than in the case of Ostrom's CPR. 
Peter Suber stresses the point that scholars hesitate to make their work OA because they fear copy-right 
conflicts with their (journal) publishers and plagiarism (Suber 2007). A clear and transparent information 
policy is the best way to counter these threats. The provision of clear rules as to what happens with the 
submitted works, which rights rests with the repository, which with the author and so on, and what 
actions might be taken in the case of violation of rules and misuse of the repository, are part of this 
need for a clear information policy.
Thus, it is expected that the provision of explicit rules as a part of its institutional design has 
a positive effect on the repositories' performance in attracting scholars to submit their work and thus 
contribute to the creation of the commons.
To summarize: the situation to be explained in this study is why, in spite of the tragic stalemate, 
some OA repositories perform more successfully than others in attracting contributions. As an attempt 
to explain this puzzle, it is assumed that the two factors - community and rules - in the repositories' 
institutional designs have a positive influence on their performance. This research setting will be 
translated into a comparative case study, shown in the following chapter.
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2. M ethodology
2.1 Dependent Variable: Performance of Thematic OA Repositories
Conceptionalization
Performance is conceptualized as the degree of successfulness in attracting scholars to submit 
their work to the repository, and thus contributing to the creation of the knowledge commons. The 
performance varies between successful, medium and unsuccessful.
Operationalization
The performance will be operationalized by using the repositories' size as an indicator.
Measurement
In order to measure the dependent variable, I will rely on the operationalization and measurement 
of a 2010 webometric study of OA repositories (Aguillo et al. 2010). This study is carried out by the 
Cybermetrics Lab situated in Madrid.3 Originally, the Cybermetrics Lab studied the performance of 
universities based on their activities on the web; primarily in the form of publications in online journals 
(cf. Aguillo et al. 2008).
Their 2010 study, however, is focused on Open Access repositories, and ranks them based on 
two variables: visibility and size (Aguillo et al. 2010: 480). The impact variable is operationalized as 
measuring the visibility of a repository on the web by counting the number of external links leading to 
it. The size variable is measured by three different indicators: size in general (the number of pages from 
Google, Liver Search and Yahoo); the number of rich files (pdf files; excluding e.g. word documents); and 
an indicator Aguillo et al. call"scholar", meaning the number of entries in Google Scholar, which indicates 
the number of citations (cp. Aguillo et al. 2010: 479-480). The indicators are summarized in Table 2.
O riginal variables Indicators and w e ig h t  (in percentage)
S ize Num ber o f  pages (20)
PDF fH*s (15)
Scholar (15)
V is ib il ity External links (50)
Table 1 Indicators used to measure the dependent variable (Source: Author's depiction)
For this paper, neither whether the repositories are actually used to find literature by other 
scholars, nor whether they are easy to find (visibility), is interesting. The only interest here is how well 
they perform in attracting contributions in the form of papers handed in (size). Therefore, only the 
second set of webometrics indicators will be used.
The webometrics study used a sample of 1184 repositories, institutional as well as thematic (see 
Aguillo 2010 et al.: 478). Only repositories with full text (preprints as well as postprints) were included.
The study not only offers the final ranks but also informs about each rank based on the single 
indicators as well. Therefore, it has been possible to take only the performance based on the size variable
3 http://repositories.webometrics.info/en/About_Us, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
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into account. However, since there is no coherent ranking based on the complete size variable, the 
outcomes of the three indicators had first to be combined into one measurement. Additionally, Aguillo 
et al. allocated different weights to the two variables and their indicators respectively (see Table 2). This 
division of weight will retain when merging the three ranking spots into one measurement (see Box 2).
(rank in number of pages (40%) + rank in pdf files (30%) + rank in scholar (30%))
= measure of size (DV)
Example: (20 x 0.4) + (350 x 0.3) + (444 x 0.3) = 246.2**
Box 2 Calculation of measure for dependent variable
* Since the second variable used by Aguillo et al. 2010 has been removed, the individual weights have doubled (cp. Table 2). 
** All sums will be converted to a round figure by rounding up (,6 - ,9) or down (,1-,5).
The maximum score for each indicator is 1184 (the worst possible rank, because there are 1184 
repositories in the webometrics ranking), while the minimum score is 1 (the best possible rank). Based 
on the formula presented in Box 2, the outcomes will be translated into an ordinal measurement of 
values of the DV using a 3-point Lickert-scale ranging from unsuccessful, medium, to successful. The 
corresponding ranks to these values can be found in Table 5 in the appendix.
2.2 Independent Variable 1: Degree of Community
Conceptualization
The degree of community is conceptualized as the degree to which a repository's institutional 
design allows for active user involvement as a part of commons-based production (Hess and Ostrom 
2007). The degree of community varies among high, medium, to low.
Operationalization
The degree of community will be measured by the following two indicators: a) possibility for 
all users to participate in the repository's management (in short: management); and b) communication 
tools for inter-user exchanges (in short: communication).
Management measures whether the repositories'users have a possibility of involvement beyond 
the autonomous submission of work. This includes the possibility for individual users to support the 
repositories with new ideas, software innovations, promotion activities, the possibility to support other 
members or any other form of active participation. Communication measures whether a chat function, a 
blog, a forum or other forms of peer communication is included in the repositories'institutional design.
2.3 Independent Variable 2: Explicitness of Rules
Conceptualization
The explicitness of rules is conceptualized as the degree to which a repository's institutional 
design provides its users with information on how the repository works; what is and is not allowed 
within its boundaries; and what happens in the case of misbehavior or misuse. The explicitness varies 
among values high, medium, and low.
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Operationalization
The explicitness of rules will be measured by the following two indicators:
1. The presence of a clear set of guidelines of how to use the repository and how to behave 
within its boundaries (guidelines);
2. The presence of sanctions against misuse or misbehavior (sanctions).
Both guidelines and sanctions may be found in the form of a policy or FAQ section or any other 
equivalent form of presentation.
2.4 Measurement of Independent Variables
The measurement of all single variables will be nominal, either present or absent. For example, 
the indicator management of IV1 measures whether there is a possibility for all users of a repository to 
be involved in its management. The indicator will be coded with the score 1 (=present) or 0 (=absent). 
Whether there are several ways of management possibility or only one, and whether these possibilities 
are strong or weak, do not matter. Only the presence or absence of a possibility is relevant.
The indicators for each variable will be combined into a final value. This means that each 
variable can score a value of 2 (both indicators show presence), 1 (only one does) or 0 (neither does). 
These measurements will be translated into a 3-point Lickert-scale, ranging from high (2), medium (1), 
to low (0). While only the two total value of IV1 and IV2 will be relevant for the analysis and conclusion, 
the individual scores for each indicator will be reported in the appendix (p. 25).
2.5 Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical considerations in Chapter 2, the expected relationships of IV1 and IV2 
with the dependent variable are as follows:
H1 : The higher the degree of community anchored in the institutional design of a thematic 
repository, the more successful the repository is likely to be in attracting scholars to submit their works.
H2: The more explicit the rules stated in the institutional design of a thematic repository, the 
more successful the repository is likely to be in attracting scholars to submit their works.
Either hypothesis will be rejected if the value of the respective independent variable matches 
the value of the dependent variable in less than 50% of the cases (<0.5). In other words, either hypothesis 
is confirmed only when the value of the respective independent variable matches the value of the 
dependent variable in more than half of the cases (>0.5).
2.6 Data Collection
All data for the analysis will be collected from the repositories' respective websites, or in a few 
cases and only upon mentioning, from websites directly linked to the repository. The method of data 
collection is thus document analysis.
2.7 Case Selection
The source for case selection is the online database The Directory of Open Access Repositories
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(www.opendoar.org). The search in OpenDOAR was restricted to thematic repositories that focused 
on journal articles (rather than e.g. grey literature or conference proceedings). OpenDOAR lists 113 of 
these repositories. In order to be included into the final sample for this study, the repositories should 
additionally:
1. be completely Open Access rather than having restricted areas for special users,
2. be facilitated in English,
3. guarantee that the majority of the items is available in full-text, and
4. be included in the webometrics sample of Aguillo et al..
Following these additional restrictions, the final sample of possible cases includes 30 repositories.
With a low number of cases (small-n), it would not be advisable to use some methods of random 
selection, since all values of the variables should be presented at least once (Babbie 2007). Thus, in 
order to have the highest possible variation concerning the two independent variables, the following 
six cases have been selected from the sample:
Aquatic Commons (marine science),
Cogprints (cognitive sciences),
HTP Prints (history and theory of psychology),
E-ms (social medicine),
Munich RePEC Personal Archive (Economics), and 
OpenMed (Medicine).
2.8 Methodological Reflections
Not all weak points of this research design can or must be named at this point. However, a few 
points shall be discussed briefly.
The measurement of the dependent variable is based on the webometrics study by the 
Cybermetrics Lab. Using their specific operationalization and measurement of OA repositories'size has 
helped make the measurement of this study much more valid than it would have been possible with 
indicators created specifically for this paper. Still, the way the outcomes of the webometrics ranking are 
used at this point implies several weaknesses.
First, there was no possibility to work with the webometric raw data, since it is not available on 
the public website. Instead, the final ranks have been used in order to determine the size of a repository 
and thus the degree of success in its performance in attracting contributions. The raw data would have 
been more exact.
Second, there has been no (not too costly) way of excluding all institutional repositories from 
the complete sample of 1184. Thus, the ranks included repositories that were not in the sample of this 
paper.This circumstance might possibly have biased the final outcomes.
Third, the practicability of using the webometric indicators instead of creating new ones 
pushed the study in the direction of using size as the only indicator for successful performance. 
However, the research question might have been better served by a study that took the number of 
individual contributors into account as well. Using size only, leaves the uncertainty that big shares of 
the contributions in a repository may be made by a few individuals or its creator(s) alone.
Furthermore, the indicator only serves to test contribution, not commitment. Ostrom identified 
commitment as one of the three big obstacles to sustainable self-governance (the other two being
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monitoring and supply, Ostrom 1990d). However, commitment has a long-term character, pointing to 
the question of whether consumers of a commons will remain contributing to its production. Size can 
only measure how much contribution has been made at a fixed point of time, but cannot say anything 
about the way it develops.
Finally, based on this indicator it is impossible to say whether scholars really submit their work 
voluntarily or merely as a reaction to some sort of mandate. The restriction to thematic repositories 
rather than including institutional ones was meant to counter this threat, but is not sufficient to 
foreclose it completely.
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3. Analysis
3.1 The Institutional Design of Selected Thematic OA Repositories
Aquatic Commons4
Aquatic Commons is a repository for natural marine, estuarine/brackish and fresh water 
environments. It was founded in 2006 by the International Association of Aquatic and Marine Science 
Libraries and Information Centers (IAMSLIC). Since 2010 the management has changed and it is now 
hosted by the International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE) in Oostende, 
Belgium.
The repository is open to everybody, but maintained by an institution. Simple users have no 
chance to join the management of the repository or take part in local decision-making. There are no 
tools for internal communication on the repository's website itself. Therefore, the Aquatic Commons 
scores low on the community variable.
As to the explicitness of rules, the picture looks rather different: the Aquatic Commons repository 
includes a detailed policy section, which clearly defines who is allowed to use the repository, under 
what conditions, as well as what happens if these rules are disregarded (the item in question will be 
retrieved from the public and the submitter will be contacted).Therefore, the Aquatic Commons scores 
high on the rules variable.
Coqprints5
Cogprints is a repository for research on cognitive sciences.
The website does not mention anything concerning the creation of the repository. Besides an 
e-mail address for technical support, there is no possibility to get in contact with the people managing 
the repository. Furthermore, it does not offer any form of community communication. Cogprints 
therefore scores low on the community variable.
The repository does neither possess a FAQ section, nor any other provision of guidelines or 
sanctioning procedures. It therefore, scores equally low on the second independent variable.
HTP Prints6
HTP Prints is a self-archiving repository for the community of scholarly historians and 
theoreticians of psychology.
It is stated that the repository is edited and directed by an individual professor and his team at 
the History & Theory of Psychology Program at York University (Toronto, Canada). Whether he founded 
the repository is unclear, although it could be assumed.The administration does not give any possibility 
for the repository users to become involved in its management. Nor does it provide any possibility for 
community communication. HTP Prints, therefore, scores low on the community variable.
The picture looks differently concerning rules. HTP Prints possesses an extensive FAQ as well 
as an explicit policies section. Here, guidelines are set for how to submit papers, which kind of papers 
fall outside the repository's spectrum and what has to be done concerning copyright issues before 
posting any item. Besides the fact that the publishers will screen all papers as to their applicability to
4 http://aquaticcommons.org/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
5 http://cogprints.org/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
6 http://htpprints.yorku.ca/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
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the repository's thematic focus and hold the right to reject submissions, there is no mentioning of any 
consequences concerning rule-breaking. HTP Print thus scores medium on the rules variable.
E-ms7
E-ms is a repository for research output in social medicine. It actively supports and stresses 
users' active participation in the OA movement. The repository was founded in 2005 as the result of a 
project conducted by the Istituto Italiano di Medicina Sociale at Rome. There is an editorial board as 
well as technical assistants working for the repository. All staff members are listed on the website.
E-ms actively invites other librarians, institutes and organizations to join them in managing and 
developing the project. It is even mentioned that the Internet makes it possible to manage the repository 
from any place in the world and any country should have its own editors. With this the repository scores 
high on the management indicator. There is, however, no tool for community communication. Thus, 
E-ms scores medium on the community variable.
The repository possesses an extensive offer of advice and guidelines, including an FAQ section, 
a section on user's privacy rights, submission policy and copyright issues. The guidelines of the 
repository's use are therefore clearly stated. Although there is a considerably more developed screening 
process for submitted items than in other cases presented so far, there is again no mentioning of how 
rule-breakings might be treated. Therefore, E-ms scores medium too on the rules variable.
Munich RePEc Personal Archive8
The Munich RePEc Personal Archive, or MPRA for short, is the branch of the wider RePEc 
initiative (Research Papers in Economics) for submissions by individual scholars rather than institutions. 
The MPRA was founded in 2006 by an individual researcher from Munich as a response to the lack of 
personal self-archiving within the RepEc network.
The Archive is managed by Munich University Library, but is supported by a decentralized team 
of editors all around the world. It is possible to join the team of editors and thereby influence the direction 
and quality of the archive. This openness towards individual involvement indicates some degree of self­
management, which is supported by a decentralized character of the local RePEc archives in general 
and the ability to easily join the network. One section of the site informs about the opportunities to 
volunteer at RePEc. This positive sense of community is strengthened by the availability of a RePEc 
blog, where community members can not only exchange their ideas on the subject, but also explicitly 
discuss their experiences with the online archive.9 The MPRA therefore scores high on the community 
variable.
Next to the community features, the repository offers a high extensity of guidelines on how 
to and how not to use the repository. Next to a FAQ section on MPRA, the user is directly linked to the 
guidelines of RePEc in general and more general information on how to make use of OA and online 
archives. Again, as in other cases, there are no clear guidelines of what happens in the case of rule- 
breaking. The MPRA therefore scores medium on the rules variable.
OpenMed10
OpenMed@NIC is a repository for medicine and allied sciences for any sort of peer-reviewed
7 E-MS went offline in 2012, for further information please refer to http://roar.eprints.org/462/, last retrieved 
on 06/05/2013.
8 http://mpra.repec.org/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
9 http://blog.repec.org/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
10 http://openmed.nic.in/1262/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
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scientific and technical documents. Although OpenMed has its origin in India, it wants to and must 
be understood as an international archive. The repository is hosted at and administrated by the 
Bibliographic Informatics Division at National Informatics Centre (NIC) in New Delhi.
Like E-ms and RePEc, OpenMed works by a decentralized team of editors. Furthermore, it 
actively states to be "open to collaboration with other organizations and institutions worldwide". 
Though less intensive than E-ms and RepEc, OpenMed is open to members' involvement in community 
management. Additionally, it provides a feature of IndMed forum.11 This forum provides the possibility 
for repository users to exchange ideas on and experiences with the archive. OpenMed therefore scores 
high on the community variable.
OpenMed possesses a document acceptance policy, in which all guidelines concerning the 
submission of items are clearly stated. Besides, it has a deposit agreement, which spells what rights 
and duties users have when submitting their work. However, even in spite of this clear agreement, the 
repository does not spell out what happens in the case a user disregards these rules. In conclusion, 
OpenMed scores medium on the rules variable.
3.2 Outcomes and Discussion12
IV1 Degree of Community
Summarizing the analysis' outcomes based on the first independent variable, two repositories 
scored high, one medium and three low.Thereby, four out of six cases scored as predicted by the theory 
(see Table 3). The first hypothesis "the higher the degree of community anchored in the institutional 
design of a thematic repository, the more successful the repository is likely to be in attracting scholars 
to submit their work" can therefore be confirmed (0.66>0.5).
Thus, evidence shows that repositories with a higher degree of community are more successful 
in attracting contributions. In a broader theoretical perspective, this means that if a repository designs 
its institutional setup in a way that its users are actively involved in the process of not only creating 
but also managing the commons, it will be more successful in attracting contributors. The provision 
of community, as the realization of a process of peer production, can therefore help overcome the 
collective action dilemma of tragic stalemate (Suber 2007).
IV2 Explicitness of Rules
On the second independent variable one case scored high, four scored medium, and one 
scored low. Thereby, two out of six cases scored as predicted by the theory (see Table 3). The second 
hypothesis "the more explicit the rules stated in the institutional design of a thematic repository, the 
more successful the repository is likely to be in attracting scholars to submit their work" is, therefore, 
rejected (0.33<0.5).
Following this outcome, explicit rules do not help overcome the dilemma of tragic stalemate. 
It was expected that, with the help of a repository, many uncertainties that hinder scholars from taking 
action and making their work OA could be reduced and the repositories' performance in attracting 
contributions could be more successful. Building on the evidence of this study, this seems not to be the
11 http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group/indmed-forum/, last retrieved on 20/3/2013.
12 The outcomes for the dependent variable are displayed in Table 6 in the appendix. Table 7 in the appendix 
summarizes the outcomes of all three variables.
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Value rVl Expected DV Measured DV Value EV 2 Expected DV Measured DV
RePEc high successful successful medium medium successful
O penM ed high successful successful liigh successful successful
E-m s medium medium medium medium medium me dium
H T P Prints Jow unsuccessful unsuccessful medium medium unsuccessful
A quatic Com mons Jow unsuccessful successful medium medium STsccessful
Cogp tints Jow unsuccessful successful lens7 unsuccessful successful
Table 3 Summary of outcomes
The table shows the values of both independent variables for all repositories studied, the expected value, and the measured 
value for the dependent variable. Cases, where the hypothesis is confirmed are marked green, while cases where the hypothesis 
is rejected are marked red.
However, this picture looks a bit different when considering the two indicators for IV2 separately 
(Table 4). This shows that while all but one of the repositories provided its users with guidelines 
(Indicator 1), five out of six did not provide any information as to what happens in the case of rule- 
breaking (Indicator 2). Thought, this skewed distribution of outcomes might simply be coincidence, 
due to the low number of cases, it is more likely that the indicator was badly chosen and has no power 
to predict the value of the variable. There are two obvious reasons why the choice of indicators was 
probably unsuitable for the analysis of rules in the cases studied: 1) no repository has the capacities to 
actually monitor what happens with items in their collections and it is therefore very unlikely that 
sanctioning procedures are included in the institutional design in the first place; and/or 2) the items in 
a repository are protected under general copyright law anyway, thus there is no need for further, 
repository-specific sanctioning. The evidence hints at possibility 2), since some of the repositories 
referred to the copyright law being in force. Option 1) can, however, also not be rejected at this point. 
The influence of rules and the possible inapplicability of sanction systems for the governance of 
knowledge commons (beyond copyright) require further research.
Table 4 Detailed outcomes for independent variable 2 "explicitness of rules"
On the other hand, the high amount of positive scores on the presence of guidelines (Indicator 1) 
could mean that rules, even more when coming in an FAQ section, are so much taken for granted, rather 
than being seen as a positive bonus, by which people decide whether to contribute to a repository or 
not.
It becomes clear that the outcomes for IV2 are much more ambivalent than for IV1. Without 
further inquiry and a change in indicators, it is impossible to draw reliable conclusions concerning the 
effect of the explicitness of rules on the performance of OA repositories.
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Conclusion
Knowledge can be considered a rather new member of the "commons family". In the research 
canon on commons and governance systems, it has long been neglected. However, with increased 
possibilities for digital publishing and research of the past decade, its relevance has grown and attention 
paid to it has increased. Open Access to (scientific) knowledge will play an increasingly important role 
in (the study of) the digital age. This paper focused on the problems of collective action in the creation 
of a knowledge commons and thus contributed to this development.
Similar to other public goods, the provision of knowledge commons depends on collective 
action and is thus prone to social dilemmas (cp. Hess and Ostrom 2007). OA repositories cannot function 
without the contribution of many participants, since only this makes them a valuable commons. 
However, this need for contribution by individual scholars is exactly a weak spot. OA repositories suffer 
from what Peter Suber (2007) called the "tragic stalemate". A situation of collective paralysis in which 
all actors involved would benefit from the provision of a common good, but all hesitate to take the first 
step for fear that others might fail to follow or might just free ride. Based on the achievements by Elinor 
Ostrom in the field of CPR management, this study assumed that repositories are able to help overcome 
this tragic stalemate by including factors 1) community and 2) rules in their institutional design.
1) Designing the creation of a knowledge commons, in this study an OA repository, as a 
community action, was expected to have a positive influence on the performance of a repository in 
attracting contributions. The hypothesis was: the higher the degree of community anchored in the 
institutional design of a thematic repository, the more successful the repository is likely to be in 
attracting scholars to submit their work.This relation could be confirmed by the case study.13 Repositories 
which have a possibility of self-governance, thus the opportunity for users to take an active role in 
management (for example by acting as an editor or local support for other users), and provide the users 
with a communication platform for exchanging ideas and experiences with OA, were potentially more 
successful in attracting participation, than those which do not.
2) The results for the impact of the explicitness of rules on the successfulness of a repository in 
attracting scholars to submit their papers were ambiguous. The second hypothesis, "the more explicit 
the rules stated in the institutional design of a thematic repository, the more successful the repository 
is likely to be in attracting scholars to submit their work", had to be rejected. Only two of the six cases 
studied showed the predicted outcome.
Several aspects of OA and OA repositories have not been touched in this paper. Most of them 
were left out in order to simplify and sharpen the analysis; others could have led the paper into a 
different direction than intended by its overall theme set by the seminar. Many of these aspects would 
serve as an interesting point of departure for further research. Two of them shall be briefly discussed in 
the following for examples.
The focus of this paper was on the institutional design of OA repositories and their influence 
on their performance in attracting participation in creating a knowledge commons. Viewed from 
a different angle, it would be interesting to test some endogenous factors on the decision-making 
process of individuals that lead them to take part in the collective action. This would mean to restrain 
from Ostrom's approach and instead take the direction of rational behavior intended by Olson. Such an 
approach would ask for a completely different research design, since the units of observations would
13 The six selected cases were: Aquatic Commons, HTP Prints, E-ms, RePEc, OpenMed and Cogprint.
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no longer be the OA repositories institutional designs, but the individual scholars instead. Incentives, or 
the perception of benefits and costs for individual actors would be analyzed.
This paper has focused on scientific knowledge in the form of journal articles. As outlined above, 
this kind of knowledge does not suffer, or rather benefits, from being made OA, because it is royalty-free 
(Suber 2007). It is assumed that scholars do not produce this good in order to earn money, but to earn 
impact. The case is slightly different with royalty-producing goods. In the context of knowledge in the 
form of books, even if most scholars do not become rich from books, they expect some sort of revenue 
from them and are more hesitant when it comes to copy-right issues. This last point is undergirded by 
the discussion that emerged around Google-books some years ago. It would be interesting to find out 
how these goods behave in the context of OA. They are still knowledge, but whether and how they 
could become commons is a question (cp. Suber 2007).
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A ppendix
Rank Value
1184-790 unsuccessful
789-395 medium
394-1 successful
Table 2 Measurement of dependent variable: translation from webometrics rank into ordinal measure based on a 3-point 
Lickert scale
Table 3 Measurement of dependent variable
IV 1 Degree of Community IV2 Explicitness of Rules DV
Indicator 1 
Management
Indicator 2 
C ommuni cation
Total.
r v i
-yr?-»- rT— i p '. T|
Indicator 1 
Guidelines
Indicator 2 
Sanctions
Total
TV2
u n r iY i ,2
Aquatic
Commons
0 0 low 1 0 medium successful
Cogprims 0 0 low 0 0 l o T T successful
HTP
Prints
0 0 low 1 0 medium unsuccessfiil
E-ma 1 0 medium 1 0 medium medium
RjePEc 1 i high 1 0 medium successful
OpenMed 1 i high 1 0 medium successful
Table 4 Summary of all measurements
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